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Direct sales of natural gas in the European Community (EC or Com-
munity) are increasing in frequency, but existing barriers to free trade in
the energy transmission sector continue to interfere with the Community
public interest. Public interest demands both regulation and deregulation.
An organized federal-like Internal Energy Market is needed to achieve
allocative efficiency, ensure a secure supply of energy, provide consistent
and coordinated licensing, rate-setting and dispute resolution procedures,
and provide transparent commodity and transportation rates. However,
the market should be deregulated to increase open competition, promote
third-party access, and in the long run, ensure lower prices and increased
benefits for core (residential or small commercial) energy users. Rapid
restructuring will cause some short-term market dislocation, but should
yield beneficial competitive dynamics in the long term.
11. THE STRUCrURE AND PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN ENERGY
MARKET
A. European Community Integration
Responsible regulation of energy is a timely issue within the European
Community.1 In a broad sense, European law is not static, but is incre-
mentally evolving towards federalism. Closer Community integration will
follow the implementation of the November 1991 Maastricht Treaty,2 if the
controversial initiatives are indeed affirmed by Member States.
Its terms were implemented into U.K. law via the European Commu-
nities (Amendment) Bill. These include: (1) common citizenship for all
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J.E.R.L. 77 (1990).
2. Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992).
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nationals of the 12 Community countries, (2) a single European currency
by January 1, 1999, at the latest, (3) new powers for the European Parlia-
ment to veto measures proposed by the unelected Commission, (4) com-
mon action on asylum, immigration, and the fight against drugs and
terrorism, and (5) a separate "social chapter" targeting improvements to
working conditions, including a dialogue between workers and manage-
ment, and proper social protection of employees. However, British Prime
Minister John Major secured three concessions: (a) the word "federal" was
removed from the text, which contemplates a process of creating "an ever
closer union among the peoples of Europe;" (b) Britain would be allowed
to decide at a later stage whether to join the single currency and accord-
ingly scrap the pound; and (c) the "social chapter" was deleted from the
main treaty and became a separate document signed by all Community
countries except Britain.
On June 2, 1992, Denmark narrowly rejected the proposals in a
national referendum, leaving the outcome of the draft Treaty in doubt.
Nevertheless, if eventually implemented, the legally binding text (as it pres-
ently stands) on subsidiarity provides that Community action would not go
beyond what was necessary in order to achieve the Treaty's objectives.
"Maastricht" means that Community members have "chosen to 'broaden'
and embrace a wider, more open, and outward looking vision."3 Interde-
pendence between nation-states requires worldwide solutions to environ-
mental problems. These solutions must share the common goal of
sustainable development. In May, 1993, Britain became the last member to
ratify the Treaty, yet this event was marred by the collapse of the European
Monetary Fund. Stringent parameters had been set for all Members' cur-
rencies. However, currency speculation forced Britain to withdraw from
the arrangement, which was to be a precursor to a single currency. When
currency speculation threatened the withdrawal of France, and total col-
lapse, the currency bands were widened so much that the dream of a single
currency was dealt a severe blow, possibly setting this objective behind by.
ten years.
B. Community Goals: The Single European Act
Notionally, the idea of a common market is relatively simple, yet the
progressive establishment of a barrier-free system4 is not straightforward.
For instance, physical frontier barriers and controls pertaining to the free
movement of goods and people are to be eliminated in their entirety by
1993. Technical barriers which operate unfairly include different environ-
3. C.AJ. Herkstr6ter, The New Europe, The Shell Lecture (University of Glasgow May 15,
1992), infra note 74.
4. In a petroleum context, the "landing requirement" of UKCS petroleum in the U.K. and
restrictions on the liquefaction of natural gas and pipeline construction were arguably indirect barriers
to the export of gas from the U.K.: A.C. Page, Competition and Monopoly in the United Kingdom
Energy Supply - The Case of Gas, 2 J.E.R.L. 30 (1984).
5. Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Comnission to the European Council,
COM(85) 310 final at 9-16. The Commission has subsequently described procurement as "an extremely
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mental and product standards, as well as divergent public procurement
requirements.6 Public procurement concerns purchases and works. A new
Directive opens competition to this big market and applies to the so-called
excluded sectors of water, transport, energy, and telecommunications.7 Fis-
cal and business barriers involve indirect taxation (value-added tax (VAT)
and excise duties), free movement of capital and services, mutual recogni-
tion of professional qualifications, harmonization of merger law, account-
ing standards, and regulation of subsidies.'
Idealistically, the so-called "single internal market"9 calls for a Europe
without internal frontiers, within a system of a customs union. This system
promotes four freedoms, namely those pertaining to goods, 10 persons,1'
services,' 2 and capital.13 A further fundamental principle of the Common
Market is the development of a common agricultural policy among the
Member States.14 Although these four objectives are primarily economic,
derogation (or exception) clauses apply to all four freedoms in order to
protect the character, traditions, and heritage of the Member States. Fur-
thermore, public ownership or participation in European energy utilities,
which is relatively high, is protected by Article 222. Yet as market partici-
pants, their behavior is governed by Articles 85-93, which are the general
rules on competition, even where it is induced by state-imposed
regulation.15
vast area which is little known and where intervention by public authorities... is rarely official." The
Internal Energy Market, COM(88)238 final at 15, para. 42.
6. Completing the Internal Market, supra note 5, at 17-40.
7. Council Directive 90/531, 1990 OJ. (L 297) 1. See generally David Marks & Rosemary
Bointon, The European Community Public Procurement Rules and the Oil and Gas Industry: the
Current Position, 10 O.G.L.T.R. 344 (1990).
8. Completing the Internal Market, supra note 5, at 41-55.
9. Blanche Sas, 1992 Implications for the Petroleum Industry, W.G. Hart Legal Workshop 1989:
The Single European Market and the Development of European Law. Institute of Advanced Legal
Studies, London. See also C.D. Ehlermann, The Internal Market Following the Single European Act, 10
C.M.L.R. 361 (1987).
10. TREATY ESTABLISH NG THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CoMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] arts. 30, 31
(Elimination of barriers, charges and measures incompatible with the free movement of goods); EEC
TREATY art. 36 (Exceptions to the free movement of goods). Impediments to the free movement of
goods include restrictions by the United Kingdom on the importing of potatoes: Commission v. United
Kingdom, 2 C.M.LR. 427 (E.CJ. 1979); poultry, Commission v. France, 3 C.M.L.R. 497 (E.CJ. 1982);
lamb, Commission v. France, 1 C.M.L.R. 418 (E.CJ. 1980).
11. EEC TREATY art. 48.
12. Id. arts. 59, 60.
13. Id. art. 67.
14. The common agricultural policy has been controversial. See FRANCiS G. SNYDER, LAW OF THE
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY (1985).
15. Leigh Hancher, Towards a free Market for Energy? - A Legal Perspective, ENERGY POL'Y,
Apr. 1990, at 233, 240-42. Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission, 2 C.M.L.R. 468 (1985). Article 86 of the
EEC Treaty prohibits abuse of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part
of it providing that trade between member states is affected. Such abuse may consist of (1) directly or
indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; or in (2)
applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing
them at a competitive advantage.
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The so-called "Internal Energy Market"16 policies are themselves part
of a fundamental policy which, pursuant to the Single European Act 1986
[SEA],17 aims to harmonize and integrate inter-Community trade. Indeed,
the Single European Act may be seen as an evolution of the Treaty of
Rome (EEC Treaty) which founded the European Economic Community,
seeking an "ever closer union" between the peoples of the Member
States.18 That multilateral agreement came into force on July 1, 1987 and it
attempts to "eliminate the barriers which divide Europe, and to strengthen
the unity of their economies. ' 9 These physical, technical, and fiscal barri-
ers to a free internal market were identified by the Commission in a com-
prehensive White Paper20 issued by the EEC in June 1985. The
Commission's so-called working document 2' on The Internal Energy Mar-
ket of May 1988 was the first Community attempt to address energy issues,
stemming from the single market. The working document drew up an
inventory of obstacles to greater integration of the energy market and
described the scope of the task ahead. "In the EC ... intra-Community
energy trade is not so well-developed, obstacles have been traditionally of
a different order. Markets have been compartmentalized by the operation
of national or at least regional - whether public or privately owned -
monopolies."22 The European energy market is extremely diverse, in
terms of products as well as end-uses. For instance, coal is not subject to
much intra-Community trade, while oil enjoys significant competition.
However, there is concern about electricity and gas production, and about
their sophisticated network infrastructure, which has mainly developed on
a national basis. Both of these energies are capital-intensive, hence the
allocation of capital resources should be made efficiently and take prece-
dence as an important policy objective. If the electricity and gas markets
become more efficient, integrated, and competitive, then they will produce
a positive effect on the industries' structures. This should encourage new
entrants, diversify fuels and technologies, increase freedom of fuel choice,
and should reduce disparities between Member States 23
16. See generally 1990 PROGRESS REPORT on the Internal Energy Market, COM(90)124 final.
17. Single European Act Suppl. 2/86. Bulletin of the E.C. In accordance with the requirement of
British law, the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1986 gives (ratifies) internal effect to the
Treaty in the United Kingdom. See generally Gordon Slynn, Introducing a European Legal Order,
Hamlyn Lectures (London 1992).
18. EEC TREATY, pmbl.
19. Id. art. 2. This provision sets out the broad integration objective: "The Community shall have
as its task ... the closer relations of the states belonging to it."
20. Completing the Internal Market, supra note 5. Its ambits may be concurrently promoted
,through secondary legislafion unlei, inter alia, EEC Tvmri arts. IWA, 213, =d ia vs m te,, aSt.
90(3).
21. The Internal Energy Market, supra note 5. This so-called "working document" seeks
"decompartmentalization of the national gas markets."
22. Leigh Hancher & Alastair Lucas, International Supervision of State and Private Organization
of Energy Trade, ENERGY LAW '90: CHANGiNG ENERGY MARErTS - THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES
(1990) (Proceedings of the Advanced Seminar on Petroleum, Minerals & Energy Resources Law
organized by the IBA's section on Energy & Natural Resources Law), infra note 49, at 196.
23. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in
Natural Gas [and] Electricity, COM(91)548 final at 3.
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It is hoped that increased cross-border demand will boost trade in gas
and electricity between Member States. But unless transmission infrastruc-
tures and interconnections are quickly developed, supply will be unable to
respond. This concerns countries not yet connected to the European net-
work, namely the United Kingdom,24 Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece.
The Commission is proposing a package to foster this development, includ-
ing a Community action program and a Consultative Committee, com-
prised of professionals' and consumers' representatives, to assist the
Commission.2 5 However "standardization" is essential: the single Commu-
nity market will become a reality for European industry only if common
technical standards can be developed progressively at the European rather
than at the national level.26
Petroleum products, electricity, and gas are to be standardized. In
particular, a European definition of "reference gases" is being made which
concerns nominal equipment supply conditions and "limit gases," referring
to extreme variations in gas characteristics. 27
Removing the barriers to intra-Community trade requires a legal
regime where electricity and gas can move "within and between Member
States in response to demand."'  This will require changing many existing
national regulations concerning production, importation, exportation,
transmission, and distribution. By implication, the completion of the inter-
nal market might benefit environmental protection through greater effi-
ciency and through adoption of "cleaner" technologies.
Reducing CO2 emissions to the atmosphere has been targeted by the
resolution (at the combined Energy/Environment Council of October
1990) in order to stabilize total Community CO2 emissions at 1990 levels by
the year 2000. European Community Energy efficiency programs were
ameliorated during the May 31, 1991 Council of Energy Ministers meeting.
However, the Energy Ministers could not agree on details to enhance the
Community's ability to deal with oil crises.29 While the EC is making some
progress, advances in a comprehensive energy policy will probably not be
achieved within the next few years.
24. The House of Commons Energy Committee concluded, "We are surprised that no
comprehensive examination of the peculiarities and cost benefits of constructing a link with the
European gas grid has been made known to us. We are persuaded that a fully competitive gas market
cannot exist in Britain without such a link." ENERGY CoMMrrrEE, SECONP REPORT, 1990, CMND 1200,
at xxix.
25. Texte E, Ach~vement du Marche Int6ieur du Gaz et de L'tlectricitd, COM(91)298 final at 7.
This document met much opposition from member states, hence the Commission decided to implement
third party access in three stages. Completion of the internal Market for Electricity and Gas,
Orientations for a Phased Approach Final version October 23, 1991.
26. Commission Green Paper on the Development of European Standardization, COM(91)52
final.
27. Texte E, Ach~vement du Marche Int6drieur du Gaz et de L'-Iectricitd, supra note 25.
28. Id at 3.
29. Community energy efficiency programs include: Community action program for improving the
efficiency of electricity use (the so-called "PACE" program), Council Decision 89/364, 1989 OJ. (L 157)
32; and the so-called "SAVE" program: Specific Actions for Vigorous Energy Efficiency, Commission
Communication to the Council, COM (90)365 final at 13.
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Vis-A-vis energy, the harmonization objective is facilitated by Article
8A of the SEA, whereby Member States amended the three founding trea-
ties of the European Communities. Article 8A(2) says: "The internal mar-
ket shall comprise an area without internal frontiers, in which the free
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance
with the provisions of this Treaty."
Clearly, this multilateral treaty affects the constitutional law of all the
Member States. It encourages greater collective action in the Community
and it will determine the ability of Member States to influence future Com-
munity law-making.30
The most significant institutional change concerns decision-making in
the Community by means of the new "cooperation procedure," which
affects only certain categories of Community legislation. This procedure
promises to increase the influence of the European Parliament (as it will
now officially be known), and the Commission, although ultimate power
will remain with the Council of Ministers. Article 100A, for example,
allows qualified majority voting by the Council, effetAively preventing v eto
by a Member State, for most measures concerning the establishment and
functioning of the internal market.31 It represents the principal mechanism
for facilitating agreement on the Single Energy Market (SEM). Indeed,
the previous practice of unanimous voting obstructed policy agreement and
budgetary progress. However, policy agreement over taxation and employ-
ment still requires unanimous voting.
Overall, the European Parliament (EP) enjoys a greater ability to par-
ticipate in the legislative process, since Article 149 of the EEC Treaty was
amended to provide for the cooperation procedure. The Parliament must
be consulted about initiatives from the Executive Council and it may pro-
pose its own amendments. If the European Parliament votes by absolute
majority to reject a Council position, then the Council can act on a second
reading providing that its decision is unanimous. Institutional changes
have been effected in other areas, namely, the official recognition of the
"European Council," which includes heads of state or governments of the
Member States. This council meets from time to time, but is not given any
specific powers or functions. Additionally, provision has been made to
ease the existing workload of the Court of Justice, by the establishment of a
court of first instance to hear certain classes of action or proceedings
brought by natural or legal persons.
III. THE INTERNAL MARKET FOR NATURAL GAS
This chapter identifies structural characteristics of the Single Energy
Market, and security of supply and environmental concerns. The emphasis
is on policy coordination between trading partners, including regulatory
30. See, e.g., Maastricht to Go into Effect After German Court Clears the Way, Agence France
Presse, Oct. 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Agence France Presse file.
31. The extent to which the Luxembourg compromise will affect the new areas of majority voting
remains to be seen. See generally ROYAL INST. INT'L AF. & Sci. POL'", RES. UNrr, A Single European
Market in Energy (University of Sussex 1989).
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authorities in different jurisdictions which are connected to a common grid.
Such policy coordination is necessary to foster a single regional gas market.
In September 1986, the Energy Council unanimously adopted energy
policy objectives for 1995.32 The Council's Resolution recognized the
diversity of national resources, needs, and policies with respect to energy,
and called upon Member States to achieve individualized general and spe-
cific objectives for 1995.33 Subsequently, these goals were expressed in a
Directive entitled The Internal Energy Market. The Directive seeks
"greater integration, free from barriers to trade, of the internal energy mar-
ket with a view to improving security of supply, reducing costs and improv-
ing economic competitiveness."'  A Community-wide dimension will
gradually complement national programs for security of supply. The Com-
mission has made tentative proposals concerning security of supply in
Member States. In fact, these tentative proposals contemplate the mainte-
nance of mutual aid from a "reserved" sector of energy supply.
35
In particular, there is clear emphasis on the need to develop an inte-
grated gas grid and on the need to identify the conditions which are a sine
qua non for direct access.
For certain energy products, such as electricity and gas for example, the States
or the regional entities give exclusive right of transport and distribution to
public and private enterprises. It is appropriate to make an inventory and
examine in what sense these exclusive rights prevent or make more difficult
exchanges between Member States... if such a situation is compatible with
the rules of the Treaty and more particularly Articles 30 and 37.3 More spe-
cifically in the transport domain and in regard to the distribution of electricity
and gas (even if these two sectors have characteristics which set them apart)
two essential economic problems seem to dominate: [11 how to encourage the
free transit of natural gas and electricity inside the Community while having a
high level of security of supply and [21 having the conditions of transport on
an economic basis. This would permit a transport or distribution company to
have direct access to a resource .. . under what possible conditions could
direct access to a resource be extended to a large industrial consumer. Both
these options imply that third parties could have the possibility to have access,
on payment of a reasonable tariff, to existing transport networks.
37
32. Resolution on the Follow-up Report on the 1995 EC Energy Objectives, 1986 O.J. (C 241) 1.
33. See generally TERENCE DAnTH & LEIGH HANCHER, ENERGY STRATEGY IN EUROPE: THE
LEGAL FRAMEWORK (1986).
34. The Internal Energy Market, supra note 5, Annex III, at 66, para. 61. Two problems
identified: (1) how to encourage free transit of natural gas (which) would permit a distribution company
to have direct access to a resource, (2) under what conditions direct access to a resource might be
extended to a large industrial customer.
35. Internal Energy Market and Energy Policy, PARt. EUR. Doc. (SEC 90) 1248 (1990).
36. Articles 30-36 of the EEC Treaty forbid tariffs, quotas and other restrictions to intra-
Community trade. Article 37 controls the conduct of commercial state monopolies, especially
regarding exclusive trade and transport rights. Proceedings were commenced under Article 37 against
Member States maintaining exclusive rights to import and export gas and electricity as well as to break
up gas and electricity monopolies. Andrew Hill, Commission Sets Sights on Electricity and Gas
Monopolies, FIN. Tn.sss, Sept. 25, 1990, at 199.
37. The Internal Energy Market, supra note 5, at 21, para. 61 (emphasis in original).
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In November, 1988, the Council agreed with the overall recommenda-
tions of the Commission in the Internal Energy Market report. 38 The over-
riding issue remains security of supply and the strategic nature of energy.39
The above priorities, however, should not result in a watering-down of the
diversification objective, nor should they prevent realization of the goal of
limiting net imports of oil and petroleum products, which amount to
approximately one-third of total energy consumption. 4°
The Commission also reported that the European energy market is
relatively partitioned, being characterized by diverse products, services,
market participants, and regimes in Member States.41 Like the economy in
general, the energy market is in a state of flux. It also possesses distinct
characteristics.
A. Market Structure and Disparities
Structurally, the gas industry differs in the respective Member States
of the European Community. According to some commentators, the struc-
ture of a utility is important, since it is a primary determinant of future
conduct.4" For instance, vertical integration dominates in France and the
U.K., states which do not have "independent" local distributors. The spec-
trum of possible vertical integration is different in Germany or, a fortiori, in
the U.S. or in Canada, where local distribution companies (LDCs) add
another contractual and administrative dimension. According to independ-
ent observers, 43 the institutional features of the western European gas mar-
kets have tended to restrain developments. The major gas exporting
organizations are characterized by monopoly, large resource rents, and
state ownership, all of which contribute to organizational slack. A different
structure would probably lower gas costs.44
The number of European suppliers is comparatively limited, largely
consisting of nationalized corporations with government-controlled mar-
keting operations.45  Thus, to prevent monopoly windfall profits, any
restructuring of the European gas industry requires regulation of the indus-
try's generation, transmission, and distribution components. "Any system
of integration proposed for the opening of the EEC's natural gas market
must account for particular characteristics of the already-existing European
38. Council of EC General Secretariat, 8954/88 (Presse 163).
39. The Internal Energy Market, supra note 5, para. 22.
40. Id. para. 24.
41. Id. paras. 8-12.
42. Dielter Helm & George Yarrow, The Assessment: The Regulation of Utilities, 4 Oxi0'-oR REv.
EcoN. POL'Y i, vii (1988).
43. Marian Radetzki, OPEC REvIEw 185, 191 (Summer 1990).
44. Id. at 191.
45. European "producer cartels" could be broken up, but, a fortiori, competition among the major
importer-exporter countries (the former USSR, the Netherlands, Algeria, Norway) would increase.
Thus, wellhead competition seems to be the aspect of gas pipeline business that most closely resembles
a workable market. US Open Access - Is It a Model for Europe: Assessing whether the US Open Access
system is A Suitable Modelfor Europe, 196 GAS WORLD 10 (1991) [hereinafter US Open Access - Is It a
Model for Europe].
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market structures and the precarious nature of limited indigenous supply
networks."'
Presently, ninety-five percent of Community natural gas is consumed
in only five Member States. The others are either developing or intending
to develop a gas industry. European natural gas production is concen-
trated in The Netherlands and the U.K., although the latter has no pipeline
interlink with the continent. A British Gas pipeline will soon link Northern
Ireland to Britain, but successful integration of the European market
requires improved interconnections.47 Linkage of Britain to continental
Europe is plausible, but requires an industry attitude change.48  This
requires coordination of energy policies. Commentators suggest that:
[i]n theory the Member States of the EC were obliged to coordinate their
energy policies and to work towards the common energy objectives stipulated
in various EC Council resolutions. In practice divergence remained, so that
the European energy market today is as fragmented and partitioned as its
North American counterpart, where there had been little attempt to synchro-
nize energy policies.49
Better coordination between the principal regulatory authorities in the
United States and Canada is arguably increasing and complementing the
pace of commercial integration in the North American gas grid.
B. European Gas Transit and Relevant North American Experience
Although the regulatory superstructure is nascent, European commer-
cial exigencies are an important force behind the restructuring initiative.
Depending on the statistical model used, demand for gas is expected to rise
from the present level of 225 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year to about
330-350 bcm per year by 2010. To some extent, increased consumption is
driving the move towards common carriage. This includes the increasing
use of gas for the generation of electricity. In 1975, the Council promul-
gated a directive limiting the use of natural gas to generate electricity. Sub-
46. Ernst-Joachim Mestmlcker, Natural Gas in the European Internal Market: A Comparative
Analysis of Common Carriage and Price Transparency, 11 MIcHi. J. INT'L L. 691,767 (1990); See Daniel
Dreyfus & Annette Koklauner, Open Access to Natural Gas Pipeline Transportation in North America:
Lessons for the European Internal Energy Market, 3 ENERGY STUD. REV. 277, 285 (1991). "Assurance
of reliability must be provided both to government, as the guardian of the public interest, and to
investors who must evaluate the risk of dependence upon the system .... Doubts concerning the risk of
deliverability failures or shortage-induced price spikes are also evident in the (North American) market
for gas, the electric power generation market, is currently confounded by the skepticism of investors in
new electric power generating capacity concerning the long-term reliability of gas as a generating fuel
option. The inability to develop convenient long-term contracts for gas to serve new investments
indicates that both users and suppliers are today unable to evaluate risk adequately to accommodate
ordinary business transactions."
47. Texte E, Achevement du Marche Int~rieur du Gaz et de L'Alectricit6, supra note 25, at 20.
48. Where Britain Leads Europe Could Follow, OFGAS NEws RELEASE, May 21,1992. OFGAS
Director General Sir James McKinnon, citing the British, said "Britain's gas industry had in the last five
years learnt a valuable lesson that others in Europe would do well to heed." He was bullish on the
possibility of a link to the European gas grid provided that there was a "change of heart in Continental
Europe to optimize the benefit of such a link."
49. Hancher & Lucas, supra note 22.
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sequently, in 1989, Member States questioned and repealed the 1973
energy crisis-induced directive, since it was now an inefficient allocation of
resources.
50
Industrial demand for gas is increasing, along with an appetite for
direct interruptible sales at discount prices; however, whether producers
are amenable to direct sales is another matter. Structurally, the European
gas industry is an oligopoly, in comparison with the hundreds of small pro-
ducers who exist in Canada alongside the major players. European skep-
tics suggest that "[i]ncorrect conclusions or intervention . . . can . . .
endanger the reliability of gas supplies and the integrity of gas pricing, as
the painful experiences made in a number of countries have taught. 5 1
Others argue that the status of transmission companies should be preserved
or even strengthened in order to balance the oligopoly of gas suppliers, to
prevent the fragmentation of purchase power during potential supply
difficulties.5 2
The gas industry also fears unnecessary "creeping regulation," arguing
that it benefits attorneys and not the consumer5 3 For -example, a sixty-
eight page report prepared by Boston's Jensen Associates, Inc., for Ger-
many's Ruhrgas, questioned the suitability of the U.S. open access system
as a model for Europe, citing vastly different gas markets. The report criti-
cized the U.S. executive branch for usurping state, Congressional or judi-
cial prerogatives, and for failing to implement a comprehensive gas policy,
upstream from the wellhead, and downstream to the burnertip.54 Despite
these criticisms, given the European Community's federal system of gov-
ernment, the Canadian and U.S. processes of "deregulation"5 5 and so-
called "common carriage" serve as a cursory model. While European
problems and responses differ in degree, the North American experience
presents a regulatory history of the restructuring costs incurred during tran-
sition from system-gas sales to an open access regime.
IV. INCREASING FREE ACCESS TO THE EUROPEAN GAS MARKET
A. European Common Carriage Proposals
Specific proposals for third-party access have been made by the Euro-
pean Commission. This chapter identifies the salient provisions of the Gas
Transit Directive and the proposals for a directive on the common rules
50. EUR. PARtL Doc. (SEC 754) 2 (1989); especially art. 1, paras. 2-4. The Commission formerly
declined to make a final decision on the Directive, allowing derogation by Member States.
51. Burckhard Bergmann, Director Ruhrgas AG, Speech at the Offshore Northern Seas
Cni -aen d xWN _ibwon (Aaug. 24, 199%). See generally 3oNNT.wK SWrHE,, EUV,-R3? GEs
MARKETS: CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY IN THE 1990s (1990).
52. Nick White, Third Party Access to Gas Pipelines, 7 O.G.L.T.R. 191 (1990).
53. Comtec-Gaz Comments on the Proposed Council Directive on the Transit of Gas Through
Major Systems, Hearing of the Committee for Energy, Research and Technology of the European
Parliament (Brussels Apr. 18, 1990).
54. US Open Access - Is It a Model for Europe, supra note 45, at 10.
55. "[D]eregulation results in a shift in the net economic benefits from oil and gas consumers to
producers and governments." John F. Helliwell et. al., Oil & Gas Taxation, 26 OSGOODE HALL L. J.
453, 480 (1988).
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needed to operate the interconnected transmission grid. These legal instru-
ments are critically examined and are contrasted with the natural gas trans-
portation experience in the United Kingdom, a Member State which leads
the Community in third-party carriage competition. While the Community
provisions are politically expedient, they do not appear to be legally effec-
tive in regulating interstate transmission. Thus, the concluding component
of this chapter identifies the basic Community competition law which will
arguably be necessary, given the absence of a more powerful regulatory
regime.
European natural gas companies stress how they cooperate, but their
economic interests are divergent from the public interest. Spare capacity
exists in European transmission systems, because a small "club" of large
import actors has shown a willingness to transport gas for each other, but
not for outsiders. For instance, in 1986 the German company Ruhrgas
refused to carry gas internationally from the Norwegian Troll/Sleipner
fields to Austria.56 European gas companies have traditionally carried gas
for other companies for an agreed price and often upon ad hoc arrange-
ments. Transmission grid owners seek more than the cost of third-party
carriage; they prefer to buy gas, add value, then resell the commodity.57
Despite industry intransigence, the liberal European Community proposals
on gas transit will alter the status quo. However, it is not clear when these
changes will manifest themselves as tangible benefits for consumers.
Presently, there are few gas importers and virtually no gas-to-gas com-
petition. Community gas markets are shared between the monopolistic
utilities/producers-importers by long-term (fifteen or more years) con-
tracts. These arrangements contain expansive take-or-pay clauses, with gas
prices being determined or indexed with reference to competing fuel
prices. As a result, consumers are unable to choose their supplier.58
Discrimination is inevitable when a pipeline apportions costs to core
customers59 (small residential, medium commercial) or noncore custom-
ers' (large industrial customers). Any eventual "right of transit" will have
to address transportation toll methodology. The Commission is duly con-
56. For a comparison of the British position, See Alexander J. Black, Competition Law and British
Natural Gas Regulation, 13 ENERGY L. J. 359 (1992); WORLD GAS REP. 8 (1987); id. at 4; STERN, supra
note 51, at 79-80, 84 n.22. The 'club' includes Ruhrgas (a consortium 60% of which consists of EXXON,
BP, Shell and Mobil) Gaz de France, Gasunie, SNAM, Distrigaz and arguably Enagas. A rare public
dispute concerning Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (abuse of a dominant position) and inter-Community
gas carriage involving Germany's Ruhrgas and Bayergas was settled before the European Court could
rule on the applicability of this provision to gas transmission services.
57. BURCKHARD BERGMANN, THE ARCHrrECrURE OF THE EUROPEAN GAS INDUSTRY BETWEEN
MARKET OPPORTUNITIES AND POLITICAL VARIABILITIES 12 (1988).
58. Texte E, Ach~vement du Marche Int~rieur du Gaz et de L'8lectricit, supra note 25.
59. Core customers are customers with no fuel alternatives to natural gas, such as residential and
small commercial customers. These customers traditionally receive gas service from gas utilities under
a "bundled" service of gas supply procurement and transportation service.
60. Noncore customers are customers with alternative fuel capability, such as large commercial
and industrial customers (including power plants and enhanced oil recovery customers). These
customers have the option of purchasing gas from a gas utility's core or noncore portfolio or choosing
to have their own gas purchases transported by the gas utility.
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cerned about energy price transparency, especially off-tariff sales of natural
gas to industrial customers.61 It has found an acceptable level of trans-
parency for the oil sector.62
Nevertheless, room exists for improvement in gas sector tariffs. After
detailed discussions with various industry and consumer groups, the Com-
mission proposed a legal instrument which will hopefully allow it to obtain
the necessary price information on gas prices for its regular publication.
63
B. Right of Transit
In July 1989, the Commission made proposals to bring about the free
circulation of gas between Member States by creating a "right of transit"
(droit de transit).64 The Gas Transit Directive 65 was approved at the May
1991 Council meeting. It is designed to facilitate and maximize gas
exchanges across non-neighbor gas transmission utilities. This measure fol-
lows approval of the Electricity Transit Directive,66 in which high voltage
transmission utilities are enjoined from providing power exchanges
through their grids, unless the arrangement would otherwise affect trans-
mission reliability.
The gas directive contemplates the growth in export capacity, as in the
case of Dutch gas to Germany or French electricity to Germany and Portu-
gal. It therefore seems reasonable, as a general rule, that allocative eco-
nomic efficiency creates a need for rights of access to networks.67 Thus, the
1989 communication6 contained a draft directive, whereby in Article 5, the
Council was enjoined from deciding the principles and "complementary
conditions relating to intra-Community transit." 69
61. The Internal Energy Market, supra note 5, Annex III, at 60, paras. 76-79; id. Annex III, para.
8. n.b.: transparency; an EC term of art concerning the degree to which transportation and commodity
rates accurately reflect their cost, including any cross-subsidization between different classes of
customer. See Commission Directive 80/723, 1980 OJ. (L 195) 35 and Cases 188-190/80 France, Italy
and the UK v. Commission [1982] E.C.R. 2545.
62. There is a weekly bulletin which is agreed upon by the Member States and the oil companies.
Council Directive 76/491, 1976 OJ. (L 140) 4.
63. Proposal for a Council Directive on Transparency of Gas & Electricity Prices Charged to
Industrial End-User, COM(89)332 final.
64. Draft Directive on the Transit of Natural Gas, COM(89)334 final; Proposal for a Directive on
the Transit of Natural Gas Through Major Systems, COM(90)425 final at 10.
65. Council Directive 91/296, 1991 O.J. (L 147) 367; "We understand (as of January 1992) that the
Commission intends to encourage other steps to integrate the energy markets before raising again the
draft directive on gas transport liberalization. Reportedly, the Commission therefore intends not to
drop, but to postpone the directive dealing with third-party access." Thomas Wdlde, European
Commission Drops Hardline Open Access Approach, GAS MATrERS, Oct. 30, 1991, at n.9.
66. Council Directive 90/547, 1990 OJ. (L 313) 30.
67. Michael Brothwood & Peter Cameron, Rights of Access to Energy Markets, A paper delivered
to the International Bar Association, Committee K, Utility Law 2 (Strasbourg, Oct. 1989) (citing
France's extra (5 to 8%) nuclear generated electrical power capacity).
68. Draft Directive on the Transit of Natural Gas, supra note 64.
69. Id Other salient provisions in the 1989 Draft Directive included: Article 3: The conditions of
natural gas transit through the gas transmission grids shall be negotiated and agreed by the bodies
responsible for the grids concerned. Article 3(2): requests for transit shall, within one month be
communicated to the Commission and the national competent authorities. Negotiations on the
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On October 29, 1990, after intensive lobbying by interest groups, the
European Community agreed in principle to a "common carriage type
directive."" ° The EC Energy Minister, Antonio Cardozo e Cunha, said that
the proposed directive did not commit Europe to a "common carrier" sys-
tem, as found in Britain.71 This statement may be indicative of the final
"right of transit." While the British system leads Europe, it is quite impo-
tent in comparison to incidents of common carriage in Canada or the U.S.
Such a radical opening of the market (as is being experienced in North
America) is felt to be too unpopular with most Member States. One rea-
son is that "gas supply as opposed to gas production is geographically
monopolized and supplier dominated."'72 The European gas market differs
from the related corporate concentration in Canada and the U.S. This per-
spective partly explains the strategy that the industry is taking when faced
with the market dislocation threat of third-party access.
For instance, oil and gas industry spokespersons have remarked on
how the British government has led the way in liberalizing the U.K. market
for gas. Ostensibly, these spokespersons agree with European Commission
moves to "free the movement of natural gas, to enhance security of supply,
and to increase competition," but they are sophisticated in their public
response to the Transit Directive.73
conditions of natural gas transit must be commenced by the responsible entities within one month after
such request. "The transit conditions must be equitable for all the parties concerned and should not
include unfair clauses or unjustified restrictions, in particular, payment for transit must take account of
the transporter's responsibilities for ensuring security of supply and contractual quality of service.
Failure to agree within 12 months necessitates that the Commission and the relevant national
authorities be notified by the interested parties who have to indicate their reasons." Article 4: In the
absence of due reasons for the failure to reach an agreement or if the reasons appear unjustified or
insufficient, the Commission, acting on a complaint from the requesting body or on its own initiative,
shall put in hand the procedures provided for by the treaty or any other applicable provision of
community law.
70. Draft Common Position of the Council Proposal for a Council Directive on the Transit of
Natural Gas through the Major Systems 10326/90, Annex I, art. 3(2): The conditions of transit shall,
pursuant to the rules of the reaty, be non-discriminatory and fair for all parties concerned, shalf not
include unfair clauses or unjustified restrictions and not endanger security of supply and quality of
service, in particular taking full account of the utilization of reserve production and storage capacity
and the most efficient operation of the existing systems. EC Energy Council Press Release (Oct. 29,
1990). "The President of the Council noted that a qualified majority within the Council was in favor of
approving the substance of a common position on this proposal as it stood following the proceedings of
the Permanent Representative's Committee and today's discussions. The Council will be requested to
act on the text as finalized by the Permanent Representative's Committee."
71. Lucy Kellaway, EC Moves Closer to Single Gas Market, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1990, at 3. The
political hyperbole has to be recognized. For instance, in an address on Sept. 3, 1992 at University of
Dundee, Centre for Mineral Law and Policy sponsored conference at St. Andrews, Scotland; Mr.
Cardoso e Cunha became a bit carried away, saying that "[n]o other area, not even the United States
has the quality of Energy in Europe."
72. Hancher, supra note 2, at 81. In a European context, regulation is arguably less likely to be
used if those affected are small in number and if consensual alternatives such as negotiation and
contracts can be used instead. H. Jarass, LAW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF ECONOMIC POLICY:
COMPARATIVE AND CRITICAL APPROACHES 86-87, 40-41 (Terence Daintith ed., 1987).
73. Council Directive 91/296, 1991 OJ. (L 147) 367.
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
It does seem... that the Commission's suggested measures, notably the con-
cepts of unbundling and regulating third-party access to gas pipelines, are out
of step with its aims. By imposing unprecedented restrictions and terms on
companies, rather than encouraging the industry to compete, to build on effi-
ciency and to invest in further market penetration, the measures run the risk
of actually reducing competition and endangering the security of gas supply in
Europe .... And in common with others, the belief in Shell is that any EC
intervention should uphold those [non-intervention] principles and not take
the backward step of adding unnecessary regulation .... It will then be
important that the UK does not allow its own position on gas liberalization to
be misapplied in the broader market of Europe through the introduction of
over-rigid regulation.
7 4
Two criticisms can be made concerning this statement. The reasoning
is fallacious in a narrow sense, since the U.K., as one member of the Com-
munity, cannot determine Community policy. It is also spurious in a
broader, value-judgment sense. It speciously denies any imperfection, or
that new regulatory responses are required to meet the exigencies of a
maturing gas distribution system in Europe.
While the Gas Transit Directive7s may be watered down following
political compromise, it contains the basic building block of prudent public
utility regulation, namely a proviso against discrimination in rates.
[Article 3 (1)] Contracts involving transit of natural gas between grids shall be
negotiated between the entities responsible for those grids and for the quality
of service provided and, where appropriate, with the entities [i.e., regulatory
authorities] responsible in the Member States for importing and exporting
natural gas.
[Article 3 (2)] The Conditions of transit shall, pursuant to the rules of the
Treaty, be non-discriminatory and fair for all parties concerned, shall not
include unfair clauses or unjustified restrictions and [shall] not endanger
security of supply nor quality of service, in particular taking account of the
utilization of reserve production and storage capacity and the most efficient
operation of existing systems.
Member States are required to take the necessary measures to ensure
that the relevant entities (i.e., pipeline companies) act without delay to
notify the Commission and relevant national authorities concerning any
request for third-party transit. 6 Provision is made for non-binding concili-
ation through the auspices of the European Commission" and, failing that,
Article 4 of the Gas Transit Directive reserves the Community competition
74. Herkstr6ter, supra note 3.
'75. Council Directive 911296, 1991 03. (L 147) 367.
76. Id In particular, this directive enjoins Member States to compel pipeline companies 1) to
open negotiations on the conditions of the natural gas transit requested, 2) to inform the Commission
and the national authorities concerned of the conclusion of a transit contract, and 3) to inform the
Commission and the national authorities concerned of the reasons for the failure of the negotiations to
result in the conclusion of a contract within twelve months following communication of the request.
77. Id. art. 4. "Each of the entities may request that the conditions of transit be subject to
conciliation by a body, set up and chaired by the Commission on which the entities responsible for grids
in the Community are represented."
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powers and procedures as the legal mechanism for dispute resolution.78
However, a question arises whether these competition powers will prove




Internationally, the Commissioners comprise a group appointed by the
Member States to serve as a kind of cabinet for Community affairs. But
under EC rules, the Commissioners can only propose rules, which must
then be confirmed by a Council of National Ministers. Thus, a step-by-step
approach was provided, inter alia, for consultation between Member States
and sectarian interests. The consultative procedure aimed to discuss
whether "third-party access to a European transport system needs to be
organized and, when necessary, under what conditions."'
Third-party Access (TPA) is a regime providing for an obligation, to the
extent that there is capacity available, on companies operating transmission
and distribution networks for electricity and gas to offer terms for the use of
their grid, in particular to individual consumers or to distribution companies,
in return for payment.81
This initiative is timely, given the impetus towards an integrated market
and the present volume of intra-Community gas trade, but the broad
framework needs to be fleshed out.82
Common rules are needed to regulate access to common natural gas
markets. The draft directives for gas and electricity require Member States
to abolish exclusive rights concerning electricity generation and electricity
and gas transmission lines. Additionally, electric and gas companies are
required to unbundle their accounting procedures to promote non-discrim-
inatory competition. Furthermore, the draft provisions specifically state
that any state aid granted to one division may not benefit another division.
This affects the remaining three EC state-controlled, vertically integrated
energy companies in Greece, France, and Italy. Lastly, electric and gas
companies must introduce third-party access to a finite group of high-vol-
ume electricity and gas consumers.8 3
78. Id. "If the reasons for the absence of agreement on a request for transit appear unjustified or
insufficient, the Commission, acting on a complaint from the requesting body or on its own initiative,
shall implement the procedures provided for by Community law."
79. The depth of distrust and opposition to the Commission's proposals for the completion of the
Internal Energy Market, and the political clout of major energy companies, was evinced in Brussels at
the 1625th Meeting of the Energy Council on November 30, 1992. At this meeting, the Council noted
reservations "in particular about the general third party access mechanisms, and indicated that debate
on the completion of the Internal Energy Market would be continued at the next meeting." 1625th
Meeting of the Energy Council (Brussels Nov. 30, 1992).
80. Draft Directive on the Transit of Natural Gas, supra note 64.
81, Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in
Natural Gas (and) Electricity, COM(91)548 final at 6.
82. Bergmann, supra note 51, at 8. Every fifth m3 of natural gas produced in a member nation is
exported to another EC country. Forty percent of EC gas is imported from non-community countries.
83. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning Common Rules, supra note 81, arts. 23, 24; A
Fair Wind Blows for the Third Party Access Proposals, EC ENERGY MoNTHLY, Feb. 14, 1992.
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The principles underlying recent proposals concerning the gas and
electricity sectors do not contemplate a "rigid structure at the-Community
level;" instead, they contemplate a gradual approach. They are based on
the principle of subsidiarity,' which requires Member States to implement
measures best suited for their particular circumstances, in order to achieve
broadly defined Community aims. However, the Community principle of
"proportionality" 5 requires the means employed to be proportionate to
the ends sought. The Commission also seeks to "avoid the trap of exces-
sive regulation." Member States will be accorded maximum authority to
implement specific measures and to resolve disputes under the principle of
minimum required regulation. Finally, the principle of progressivity recog-
nizes the need for a transition period to allow industry time to adapt to
proposed measures. 7 These principles will be implemented under a three-
stage procedure.
A consultant's report, widely circulated in the industry but never fully
disseminated to the public, examined the potential advantages and draw-
backs of EC common carriage.' The Coopers and Lybrand Report
recommended:
IV. establishing a separate body responsible to the Commission with suffi-
cient delegated powers to effectively police comnion carriage, including
policing of dominant positions,
V. the drafting of fair and reasonable transmission guidelines including the
ratio of transmission tariffs to the average cost of the facilities used and
special charges for interrupted service,
84. Cf Herkstr6ter, supra note 74, at 2: "Subsidiarity will hopefully put an end to centralized
bureaucratic regulation which defines, to the smallest detail, the way in which things must be done. It
opens the door for sensible regulation that is close to the market and to players in the market, then puts
the onus firmly on those players to do what is required in the most effective way, and, lastly, judges the
outcome."
85. Commission of the European Communities, XXth Report on Competition Policy
(Luxembourg, 1991) (ISBN 92 826 2314 9). Introduction: "Regulated sectors and those in which
companies enjoy exclusive rights will have to be subject to the rules of competition if the internal
market is to function properly. [T]he Commission will apply the rule of proportionality in deciding
whether these services of a general economic interest can be effectively provided in any other way than
by granting exclusive rights to particular suppliers. Such services of a general economic interest are
usually found for basic utilities (e.g. gas, water, electricity, telecommunications, etc.). [A] further
consideration is that many of these services necessitate a near universal network in each Member State
and the Commission has to see to what extent the principle of open access to the network can allow
competition without prejudicing the provision of the service."
86. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning Common Rules, supra note 81, at 7. The
principles follow the EEC Treaty Article 100(a) approach which fosters dialogue between the Council
and the EC Parliament.
87. Texte E, Aeh~vement du Marche lntdrieur du Gaz et de L'l.lectricitd, supra note 25.
88. Coopers & Lybrand Belmont et. al., Study on the Advantages and Drawbacks for the European
Community of the Introduction of a System of "Common Carrier" for the Transport of Natural Gas 8
(Brussels, July 18, 1991). Final Report issued by the Directorate-General for Energy, Commission of
the European Communities, January 1989. The study was not a robust defense of open access and
ostensibly looked like a systeroatic critique. Nevertheless, the EC asked for a follow-up to quantify
potential benefits of open access, assuming the potential could be realized. These were found to be
about two percent of gas costs. Although the report is skeptical about the wisdom of introducing a
common carriage system in Europe, it acknowledges the need for additional regulation to
accommodate such a regime.
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VI. requiring inter-regional gas supply companies to publish development
proposals so as to facilitate third-party capacity requirements. By taking
on additional investment costs, inter-regional supply companies would
be obliged to create corresponding capacity,
VII. developing a measure to prevent abuse of third-party transportation by
the transmission companies.8 9
Presently, the Commission is implementing the Gas Transit, the Elec-
tricity Transit, and the Transparency Directives, which contain the "com-
mon rules necessary" for achieving the second stage.' The second stage
itself has three elements:
First, it is necessary to create a transparent and non-discriminatory system for
granting licenses for the production of electricity and the building of electric-
ity lines and gas pipelines .... Second, the concept of unbundling, i.e. separa-
tion of the management and accounting of production, transmission and
distribution operations, must be put into practice in vertically integrated
undertakings .... Finally, Third-party Access (TPA) must be introduced on
"a limited basis" ... whereby the transmission and distribution companies are
obliged to offer access to their network to certain eligible entities at reason-
able prices within the limits of ... capacity.9
Examples of "eligible entities" include large industrial users and distribu-
tion companies whose demands exceed a certain threshold (provided that
other industrial and domestic users benefit indirectly from TPA). 2
D. Third-Party Access Thresholds
The Natural Gas Directive does not pertain to exploration and pro-
duction.93 Third-party access to the network will begin by "progressive
adaptation" and by the use of an interconnected network, and will be lim-
ited to suitable undertakings (i.e., large consumers and distribution under-
takings). A threshold of 25 million m3 per site has been set for individual
companies. For distribution companies, a threshold of one percent of
national gas consumption has been set, as compared with three percent (of
the energy distributed in each Member State) in the case of electricity.94
E. EC Take-or-Pay Obligations
Liberalization of European gas transportation must face the problems
created by long-term supply contracts, which include onerous take-or-pay
89. Mestmacker, supra note 46, at 699.
90. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning Common Rules, supra note 81, at 10, para. 6.5.
The third stage or phase of TPA is to be introduced by January 1, 1996 on the Commission's evaluation
of Phase 2.
91. Id. at 9, para. 6.3. By January 1, 1996, the Commission expects to evaluate the second phase
and widen the scope of Third-Party Access.
92. Id. at 9.
93. Id. at 23, pt. C, para. 3.1, "Detailed proposals for natural gas for the realization of the second
stage."
94. Id. at 23, pt. C, para. 3.2. Stage two for third-party (industrial customer) electricity access was
set at 100 GWh/yr or more (equivalent to 25MW for 4000 hours a year). The Commission estimates
that 400-500 large customers will benefit with the freer market for electricity as will 100 or so
distributors.
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provisions. Regrettably, there is neither a regulatory body in the Commu-
nity with the power to intervene in contracts between Member States, nor a
provision for the creation of such a "European Energy Commission" under
the terms of the EEC Treaties.9" In the absence of stronger political con-
sensus, the provisions of the draft directive on common rules have to be
seen as the next best alternative.
Article 24 of the Commission's draft directive acknowledges that the
TPA regime may induce Member States to rescue gas companies from
take-or-pay exposure. However, this type of state aid will require prior
Commission approval. Take-or-pay obligations involve important sanctity
of contract principles. 96 The Natural Gas Directive97 seeks to protect the
economic viability of existing gas companies while liberalizing the market.
A take-or-pay clause obligates a purchaser to pay for a percentage (a
predetermined annual volume) of the gas which a seller can produce,
whether or not the purchaser actually takes the gas. These risk sharing
arrangements shift the long-term volume decline risk from the producers to
the gas companies. The clauses were utilized to facilitate capital-intensive
investment required for constructing the industry infrastructure at a time
when the market was beginning to develop. The commodity price is usu-
ally linked or indexed to oil (the main alternative fuel) prices, and since the
price can rise or fall, the risk exists in both directions. The Natural Gas
Directive98 envisages the need for offtake security, in the form of take-or-
pay provisions, will wane in an interconnected European gas market.
Nevertheless, take-or-pay provisions remain an important factor along
with other price-related provisions. For instance, European gas demand
fell between 1982 and 1984 when gas prices and delivery conditions failed
to respond fast enough to price changes in alternative fuels. Many arrange-
ments were renegotiated, and subsequently, fuel adjustment clauses (FACs)
increased the frequency of price and shortened the periods for indexation
to about three months by the end of the 1980s. Following the development
of the Norwegian Troll field, gas was sold on a netback (net of transporta-
tion costs) market basis. This guaranteed that continental importers would
pay a price commensurate with competing fuel costs, but failed to account
for production and transportation costs in relation to prevailing energy
prices.99
95. Brothwood & Cameron, supra note 67, at 2. The Internal Energy Market, supra note 5, at 83:
At one time the Commission contemplated the idea of an EC regulatory authority, yet hasn't raised the
possibility: "[t]he Community's natural gas industry could, for example, set up a flexible joint body to
deal with carriage and the administration of the European gas pipeline network, access to which would
be open to all transport companies in the Community."
96. "Pervasive regulation and contracts do not coexist well." Richard J. Pierce Jr., Natural Gas
Regulation, Deregulation and Contracts, 68 VA. L REV. 63, 113 (1982).
97. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning Common Rules, supra note 81, para. C 3.5.1.
98. Id
99. STERN, supra note 51. In Canada, instead of regulated producer prices, a netback pricing
system was introduced whereby "producers received the netback from the . .. [marketing arm of
TransCanada Pipelines Ltd.] .... "; "Western Gas Marketing (WGML)-distributor negotiated
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A parallel approach for gas and electricity is relied upon in the gas
proposal. The Natural Gas Directive has proposals that differ from the
Electricity Directive (which is contained in the same Commission docu-
ment),' ° but it also shares similarities with the draft electricity directive
concerning third-party access to, and operation of, the Community electric-
ity grids. These similarities require a conjunctive reading of the Commis-
sion commentary concerning the electricity proposals. 1°1
Unfortunately, a palliative to protectionism seems to have been stuck
into the Directive as a political compromise. The Directive contains a safe-
guard clause'0 2 that allows a Member State, with the Commission's
approval, to take "appropriate measures" in times of shortage if one of its
gas companies faces economic difficulties due to existing take-or-pay obli-
gations. This rather vague sounding clause threatens to emasculate the
Community controlled third-party carriage regime. Community supply
safeguards are needed. 10 3 Inter-Community gas carriage rates (and related
take-or-pay agreements that also contemplate transportation of the com-
modity) should be set by the Commission or its agent, but the Directive
seems silent in regards to the administrative mechanism to determine
charges, rate rationale, and rates of return. Although charges should be
"reasonable," the Directive fails to identify the person responsible for
determining this mixed question of law and fact.
F. Uncertain Rate Rationale
European Community rate regulation will only affect competitive
(third-party industrial/commercial) pricing of electricity or gas. Member
States retain their regulatory powers concerning gas and electricity pricing,
including standardized national prices, for all end-users who are not eligi-
ble for TPA.1' 4 Member States remain free to determine the scope of dis-
tribution companies' rights and public service obligations.
Furthermore, the Commission will not interfere with the right of states
to establish licensing criteria for the generation and transmission of elec-
tricity and gas. Exclusive distribution rights may be granted as long as grid
access is granted to eligible users. Users can buy from another supplier by
means of a direct line (this refers to "bypass") if the transparency require-
ments are met. 0 5 Member States can set the criteria for granting licenses
to construct power stations, transmission lines, and distribution lines."°
wholesale prices rolled-in with the netback from export sales." R. HYNDMAN, IMPACT OF NATURAL
GAS DEREGULATION IN PRODUCING PRovINcEs: ALBERTA, at 8 (Alberta Dept. of Energy, 1987).
100. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning Common Rules, supra note 81, at 25, para. C 3.
101. Id. at 13, pt. B.
102. Id. at 28, para. C 3.6.3.
103. A Fair Wind Blows for the Third Party Access Proposals, supra note 83.
104. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning Common Rules, supra note 81, at para. 6.4(ii).
105. Id. para. 6.4(ii).
106. Id. para. 6.4(iii).
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Finally, Member States will be free to choose how they will implement
the Directive."° They will be able to determine their own regulatory
regimes. While this may be a paean to commercial freedom, it may simul-
taneously complicate the market mechanism. Indeed, it may lead to intra-
Community regulatory forums that are diverse and it may conflict with the
inter-Community forum.
The failure of the European Community to set transportation and, by
implication, commodity prices for all inter-Community sales creates a regu-
latory conundrum. First, in order to properly regulate third-party (direct)
sales, the Commission requires complete financial, economic, and contrac-
tual information regarding both the majority volumes destined for core cus-
tomers and the third-party volumes. More importantly, European gas
regulation uses the term "non-discriminatory" with a connotation that does
not fully comprehend the nuances of cross-subsidization between different
classes of customers. For instance, bulk industrial buyers usually receive
discounts because of their ability to switch easily to competing fuels, while
captive core residential customers cannot change so readily.
In contrast to the European Community, Anglo-American law refers
to "unjust discrimination," recognizing the inevitability of some discrepan-
cies between customer classes. In common law countries, the art of public
utility regulation involves apportioning the burden of a utility's revenue
needs among customer classes. Thus, the EC proposals set a markedly dif-
ferent jurisdictional competence than exists in the U.S. and Canada. In
contrast with North American states, EC Member States will have greater
scope of authority in avoiding (and arguably disrupting) central control by
characterizing rate issues as pertaining to core customers. To alleviate this
problem, the Community should assert plenary transportation pricing con-
trol over all inter-Community bound gas. This would be similar to federal
interstate and interprovincial competence in the United States and Canada.
G. Dispute Resolution Procedure
Article 25 of the proposed gas directive allows a member state to use
national measures in the event of an "energy crisis," an event which is not
defined. Article 25 also provides that Member States shall establish a dis-
pute resolution procedure, by which the parties can settle disputes on mat-
ters covered by the Directive."' 8 Such a dispute resolution procedure is
uncertain, and not binding as it stands. A fortiori, the draft Directive's pre-
amble states that "[w]hereas, in accordance with the principle of sub-
sidiarity, general principles providing for a framework must be established
at the community level, but their detailed implementation should be left to
the Member States."' 0 9 Furthermore, Article 10 provides that:
Each transmission [c]ompany shall prepare and publish an annual estimate on
the demand for gas in its area and on the system transmission capability,
including transfer capabilities to and from neighboring systems. The estimate
107. Id. para. 6.4(iv).
108. Id. at 82, art. 25.
109. Id. at 60.
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shall cover a period of at least 10 years beginning from the year in which it is
prepared.' 10
Under the subsidiarity principle, Member States will be left to admin-
ister a virtually meaningless reporting requirement."' Since gas demand
information and system transmission capability information is required for
transparency, responsible regulation will not be achieved by an obvious
political compromise made at the expense of the public interest. Thus, it
will be Member Governments which will, during Phase Two at least, decide
the extent to which the provisions of the Directive become a reality or
simply lie dormant in their legislation." 2
Along with industry opposition to the unbundling and transparency
proposals, third-party access seems destined to provoke the most opposi-
tion. For example, industry lobby groups such as Eurogas and Euroelectric
have vociferously argued against forced imposition of TPA. Previously, the
Netherlands and Germany (lobbied by its largest carrier, Ruhrgas) voted
against the proposal to introduce third-party access during the so-called
stage one of the Internal Energy Market. 13 Conversely, the U.K., which
took over the Council Presidency in July 1992, was the only Member State
firmly in favor of third-party access. Lastly, not a single gas company sup-
ported the Transit Directive." 4 Reaching a common position will thus be a
priority. Despite industry opposition, "[c]ompetition in generation and
transmission line construction is essential in the Single Market." Third-
party access seems inevitable in the EC, but the timescale and thresholds
still require political negotiation."'
Regrettably, a lacuna exists in EC energy law. There is a marked
absence of a real Community energy policy concerning security of supply.
Such a policy is needed to cope with the environmental and free-market
pressures that are increasing in the industry.1 16
H. Transparency
Price and market transparency are essential requirements for competi-
tion generally and for evaluating costs and prices in the energy industry."
7
110. Id. at 69, art. 10. Earlier drafts (including Texte E, Achtvement du Marche Intdrieur du Gaz
et de L'lIectricitd, COM(91)298 final at 57), were extremely stringent and exacting upon gas
companies, e.g., obligations to report average and peak demand, load curves, etc.
111. See, e.g., id. Article 9 (1) requires transmission companies to provides other interconnected
parties with "sufficient information to ensure the secure and efficient operation and the coordinated
development of the interconnected system."
112. JONATHAN STERN, ROYA.L INsr. INr'L APi. ENERGY & Eqvnt- PRGoGR.Amt, T"mVn PATYrv
AccEss iN EUROPEAN GAS INDUSTRIES 12 (1992).
113. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning Common Rules, supra note 81; A Fair Wind
Blows for the Third Party Access Proposals, supra note 83.
114. A Fair Wind Blows for the Third Party Access Proposals, supra note 83.
115. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning Common Rules, supra note 81; A Fair Wind
Blows for the Third Party Access Proposals, supra note 83.
116. A Fair Wind Blows for the Third Party Access Proposals, supra note 83.
117. John Maurice Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 Am. EcoN. REv. 241
(1940).
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Previously, the Commission acknowledged that there is a trend towards
transparency in gas prices, and that "transparency is particularly difficult to
achieve in relation to off-tariff sales to industrial customers." ' Industrial
customers throughout the leading western countries increasingly employ
dual-fire boilers or generators. Their ability to switch to a competing fuel is
the overriding reason for price discrimination in their favor. Residential
and small commercial customers invariably cannot economically switch
over to an alternative fuel. Whether such discrimination is justifiable and
fair, is a matter of fact to be determined by the relevant regulatory author-
ity pursuant to its enabling legislation.
A Council Directive on price transparency 1 9 requires electricity and
gas utilities to supply the Community Statistical Office with the rates they
charge to all types of customers. These figures have traditionally been pub-
lished in the aggregate with a pledge to respect confidentiality. Outsider
scrutiny has thus been inhibited by integrated utility undertakings which
publish their accounts on a consolidated basis.120 Furthermore, underlying
European contractual relationships for gas "have been shrouded in secrecy
to such an extent that it is difficult to go beyond a description of underlying
principles.""12 The Directive, however, requires companies to keep sepa-
rate accounts for each of their divisions (i.e. transmission, storage, local
distribution, industrial gas sales distinguished from other purposes, and gas
commodity purchases). New accounting rules require auditing of annual
accounts in accordance with the rules of national legislation concerning
limited liability companies. Unfortunately, the new transparent figures
may not be very revealing in the absence of expressly defined rules against
cross-subsidization and undue preference sanctioned by a strong European
regulatory authority.
This crucial Directive will thus have to be buttressed by Community
competition case law.' 22 Article 90 of the EEC Treaty concerns the appli-
cation of competition rules to public undertakings which enjoy special or
exclusive rights granted by Member States and the power of the Commis-
sion to issue directives remedying relevant mischief. Transmission compa-
nies could possibly be characterized as entities enjoying special rights. For
example, in the Transparency Directive Case,12-' the Court of Justice
118. Completing the Internal Market, supra note 5, at 60-61. For example, the British gas
regulatory body suggested that certain industrial prices are out of line with EC prices. The EEC
Industrial Gas Market, OFGAS 18-21 (Jan. 1989).
119. Council Directive 90/377, 1990 O.J. (L 185) 16. This goes further than the proposals in The
Internal Energy Market, supra note 5, para. 79, noting the need to "combine a minimum of
transparency with dialogue between the parties concerned and a normal degree of confidentiality
(secret statistics)."
120. Texte E, Achvement du Marche Intdrieur du Gaz et de L'tlectricitd, supra note 25.
121. STERN, supra note 51, at 18-19.
122. RoYAL INST. INT'L Ap7'. & SCI. POL'Y UNTr, supra note 31, at 54; The Internal Energy Market,
supra note 5, at 24.
123. Case 188/80, France v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 2545; Case 189/80, Italy v. Commission, 1982
E.C.R. 2545; Case 190/80, United Kingdom v. Commission, 1982 E.C.. 2545. In Case 202/88 France v.
Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 3611, the Telecommunications Directive case, these powers were
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acknowledged the Commission's Article 90 (3) powers 24 to obtain infor-
mation concerning financial dealings between public undertakings and gov-
ernments. Thus, transparent energy prices will probably result in cases of a
visible regulatory presence via Community competition law.
L Operating the Interconnected Grid
Article 4 (1) empowers Member States to grant licenses for the inter-
state construction and operation of natural gas, including Liquified Natural
Gas (LNG), facilities and transportation systems. The application proce-
dures must be non-discriminatory and, according to Article 4.4, were to be
adopted by Member States by July 1993. Article 4 (2) requires Member
States to set the criteria for the licensing concerning the building and oper-
ation of interstate facilities, transmission lines, and distribution lines.
These criteria contemplate, among other things, environmental concerns.
Article 4 (3) permits refusal of an application if requirements can be "satis-
fied by the existing transmission and distribution capacities available in the
interconnected system at a reasonable and equitable price." Lastly, Article
4 (8) requires Member States to give reasons for refusing related applica-
tions, and provides for appeals from such refusals.
Article 5 provides for bypass of the transmission and local distribution
facilities by allowing construction of direct lines. Member States are
required to meet the directives concerning interconnected transmission
(Article 7). The system's operation shall be "assured individually by each
transmission company,"'1 and "each transmission company shall not dis-
criminate between users or classes of users of the system.' '1 2 6
Article 12 provides that third parties may apply to transmission com-
panies to enter into an agreement for the use of their systems. In response,
the transmission company shall either "propose an agreement," or "refuse"
(giving reasons) "to make a proposal ... if such use would prejudice the
transmission or storage of natural gas or the import or the export of LNG
in fulfillment of any statutory obligation or contractual commitments.' ' 127
Proposals for an agreement shall include proposed transmission company
obligations relating to the entry point(s) where gas will be accepted.12
Each transmission company shall publish the basis upon which the terms of
connection to and the use of the system will be set. The publication shall
contain sufficient information to enable a reasonable assessment of the tariffs
controversially used to implement a general ban on the conferral of certain exclusive rights on state
telecommunications agencies.
124. Article 90(3) clothes the Commission with a duty of surveillance, executed by the adoption of
Directives and Decisions (which may be preventative or curative) addressed to the Member States.
Article 90(3) provides a "particular procedural Framework for the enforcement of some of the more
general obligations resulting from Article 5(2)." Hancher & Lucas, supra note 49, at 189.
125. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning Common Rules, supra note 81, art 8. See
generally Robert Bell & Deborah Porter, A Single European Market for Natural Gas, 10 O.G.L.T.R.
307 (1991).
126. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning Common Rules, supra note 81, art. 8(5).
127. Id. art. 12(2).
128. Id. art. 12(3).
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that would be payable for natural gas transactions involving the use of the
system. 1
2 9
Article 12 also requires that transmission company tariff terms be
"reasonably related to long-term costs incurred in the provision of the rel-
evant service, together with a reasonable rate-of-return" on the capital
employed. 130 Ominously, the "transmission company shall not discriminate
between any person or classes of persons" vis-h-vis terms concerning con-
nection to the system.13 In the event that capacities are not used or are
partly used, the contractual right of LNG storage for transmission usage
will be lost.132
Freedom of third-party access to the gas grid requires an intercon-
nected network. It will therefore be the responsibility of the entities in
charge of managing the interconnected network to define "harmonized,
transparent, and non-discriminatory procedures" for transportation. 133 A
period of "progressive adaptation" is envisaged.13 Mysteriously, unlike
the Electricity Draft Directive, there is no positive requirement for a gas
transmission system operator. The office is defined, but not mandated.
This omission begs the question: how will the coordination and rate setting
take place?
The "distribution system operator" is defined as an undertaking hav-
ing the "responsibility of operating and developing a natural gas distribu-
tion system.' 35 "Member States shall ensure that natural gas companies
are operated on commercial principles and shall not discriminate between
these undertakings as regards either rights or obligations.' 36 Thus, the
failure to specifically nominate a specific distribution system operator
implies that the third-party access procedures will rely upon the goodwill of
pipeline companies.
IV. CONCLUSION
Direct sales of natural gas are part of a changing legal regime which
must be seen as part of an ongoing process, with promotion of the Commu-
nity public interest as its ultimate goal in the monopolistic energy transmis-
sion sector. Community goals require some reduction in Member State
competence (national deregulation) and some corresponding increase in
central government power. Increased governmental intervention is being
substituted for free market forces in an attempt to balance the general
interest with individual claims.
European Community harmonization is thus a progressive effort to
remove barriers. For lack of better nomenclature, this "ever closer union"
129. Id. art. 12(5).
130. Id. art. i2(6).
131. Id. art. 12(7).
.132. Id. art. 12(8).
133. ld. note 81, pt. B, para. 4.3, at 18.
134. Id. pt. B, para. 4.4, at 18.
135. Id. Annex 2, at 62.
136. Id. art. 3, at 63.
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resembles federalism. The adoption of various legal documents and poli-
cies are hallmarks of the Internal Energy Market program, but the pace of
harmonization is incremental. Unlike Canada or the United States, the EC
"federal government" structural rules were not set up a priori. Further-
more, the European Community does not have a strong natural gas regula-
tory authority. Nonetheless, de facto sovereignty of Member States (who
desire to remain in the Community) is lessening, although de jure sover-
eignty remains. Reduction of Member State sovereignty is the price of
reaping the advantages of a common marketplace with a common
microeconomic policy.
Microeconomic policy concerns governmental initiatives that attempt
to influence sectors of the economy. Because regulatory board decisions
have an extraterritorial application and affect those in other jurisdictions
along a common grid, expectation interests can be prejudiced by capricious
and inconsistent changes in regulatory policy. Thus, market tensions exist
in North America despite the Canada-U.S. Free-Trade Agreement 137 and
long-standing comity. There, domestic regulators have a legal mandate to
protect the interests of producers, brokers, pipelines, and consumers within
their jurisdiction. Legislative and proprietary conflicts with companion tiers
of government are characteristics of federalism. Thus, the scope, fre-
quency, and sophistication of these democratic conflicts will increase as the
Internal Energy Market matures. This maturation process includes the
deregulation of current European Community natural gas transportation
arrangements.
Instead of ad hoc carriage arrangements by European pipeline compa-
nies, the shared authority of a federal-like Internal Energy Market will, to
some extent, systematize procedures. Presently, the market does not func-
tion freely. Thus, ad hoc arrangements will have to be replaced in order to
achieve allocative efficiency. Microeconomic theory indicates that control
of the commodity price of natural gas is unnecessary and supports deregu-
lation (of cartel-controlled commodity prices) in this sense. There is also a
strong normative or philosophical movement in favor of such "deregula-
tion" to the extent that gas brokerage transportation contracts can be
unbundled. In order to achieve this result, efficacious and centralized
transportation regulation, involving transparent rates, is needed to control
the monopolies which will constitute an integrated European gas grid.
Pipeline regulation licensing and rate-setting are quasi-judicial func-
tions that require coordination and consistency in order to cope with con-
flict and minimize disputes. The Natural Gas Draft Directive and Price
Transparency Directives are part of a symbiotic dichotomy; both must func-
tion efficiently to facilitate the goal of third-party access. Without strong
natural gas utility regulation and the attendant unfettering of competition,
concentration of power and misallocation of resources will continue.
Unfortunately, anti-competitive forces appear to be restraining the
pace and scope of Community natural gas transit reform. Full liberaliza-
137. Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988).
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tion will have to wait until 1996, and the actual details will depend on the
success of the second phase. Negative interest group behavior seeks to pre-
serve the monopolistic transmission broker systems within Member States.
Some industry spokesmen appear dogmatic and intransigent. They reflect
the position of their respective interest groups by ostensibly supporting
competition principles and lamenting excessive governmental controls.
Competition in the gas transportation industry is usually successful in the
sense that it weeds out real competitors. Pipeline interests are monopolies.
or quasi-monopolies characterized by economies of scale. They need a
check on their inherent tendency to seek windfall profits.
Initially, the proposed right of transit will only marginally benefit core
residential customers. Unfortunately, the EC gas interconnection and
coordination rules are so weak that they amount to a policy of voluntarism.
The European Commission Energy Council appears to be reserving its for-
mal competition powers until market forces and the specific directives fail
to achieve their goals. This is a form of negotiated regulation.
Accordingly, the Canadian and American experience is of marginal
political relevance to the European common carriage question. It does,
however, offer a vivid regulatory and procedural benchmark. Unlike the
small group of North Sea based producer cartels, both the United States
and Canada possess a mature industry currently coupled with thousands of
producers and considerable excess capacity (the gas bubble).
Following the collapse of communism, the 1990s is the age of a new
Europe, complete with new markets and opportunities. The North Ameri-
can experience provides an historical account of a changing industry and
the legal mechanisms employed to balance the interests of the main indus-
try actors. The North American restructuring experience presents a source
of information for use by European natural gas regulators, who will have
to cope with the inevitable transition costs of a new regime.
Compared to Europeans, Americans and Canadians have greater
practical experience in energy regulation. This experience includes a his-
tory of market-determined prices, a subsequent period of regulated prices,
and then a move back to deregulated prices. The environmental impact of
the industry also maintains an extremely high profile. Nevertheless, the
associated experience, with direct sales in both countries, may be of general
interest to Europeans, who must make important value decisions concern-
ing the stewardship of a vital energy resource. The physical fact of excess
capacity has been proven; it warrants third-party access in order to allocate
resources for the greatest public benefit.
The theoretical economic efficiency of capacity brokering is also com-
pelling, even though the current conflict between the California Public
Utilities Commission, Alberta Producers, and Canadian regulators looks
like a longer term restructuring problem. As the European gas grid
evolves and interconnection increases, so too will the sale of excess capac-
ity by third-party brokers increase. By alleviating the institutional Commu-
nity barriers to market entry, commercially founded realities will
encourage renegotiation of supply contracts.
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Proponents of third-party access argue that community and non-com-
munity producers will compete better if given greater access to European
markets at the reduced prices likely to result from an unimpeded market.
They believe the gas industry profits unduly from its monopolistic position,
and that market entry of rivals is effectively precluded. Unfortunately,
strong opponents, including self-serving industry insiders, counter the weak
alliance in favor of TPA. These opponents assert it has yet to be proven
empirically that direct purchases from alternate suppliers are compatible
with security of supply and low prices. Yet empirically, Canadian core cus-
tomer prices have fallen (albeit not as much as consumer groups expected)
following the advent of direct sales.
European skeptics' strategic opposition to TPA involves tactics of
bluffing and delay with constructive responses to the new initiatives. The
industry fears that the modest "right of transit" proposals will snowball into
full-fledged common carriage, involving redistribution of risks at its
expense, and, therefore, seeks to maintain its protected position. Since
present supply arrangements are fully contracted, and direct sales have to
be financially attractive in order to induce purchasers to leave the security
of system gas, it seems likely that relatively small amounts of direct sales
will occur. The existing take-or-pay agreements were freely negotiated with
suppliers, and it is improbable that they will be put aside by administrative
fiat. The sanctity of the freedom to contract should be upheld to protect
the legitimate expectation interests of capital.
In any event, the new regime arguably lacks the administrative teeth
to change the contracts that contemplate both transportation and broker-
age functions. If these contracts are not voluntarily renegotiated, their
buyers must honor them and face simultaneous competition from the sup-
pliers' direct sales. The controlling contract provisions will probably call
for prices above the unregulated market-clearing price. Hence, the right of
transit will require hard choices to be made concerning competition. Many
more proactive steps will have to be taken by the European Commission.
A balance will have to be struck between pipeline ownership and
third-party carriage. One way to do this is to encourage pipeline profits by
incentive rate regulation. However, given the comparative Canadian and
American experience, deregulation is not a panacea for neutralizing nega-
tive interest group behavior. In Canada, anti-competitive forces are pre-
vailing so far as core (residential or small commercial) customers are
concerned. Well-organized Canadian interest groups have influenced the
determination of this public policy initiative, receiving the benefits of
deregulation through cross-subsidization by poorly organized core market
customers. The onus should be on proponents of deregulation to prove
that the system is superior to the status quo. The difficulties of implement-
ing deregulation should be analyzed beforehand, and deregulation should
be implemented quickly once decided upon.
Quick implementation is an economic-legal ideal that is difficult to
achieve due to a lack of political consensus. Nevertheless, quick implemen-
tation would be more efficacious than the gradual approach recommended
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by some commentators. A gradual approach will admittedly lessen the
acuteness of market restructuring, but will also extend its duration and ten-
sion. History suggests that those who object to change are usually those
who stand to benefit most from the retention of the status quo.
The efficacy of European Community natural gas regulation will
largely rest upon the pertinent powers provided to the dirigible Commis-
sion and the delegated entity responsible for regulating gas transportation
through the common grid. The new regime will have a long learning curve
before costs come down. Monopoly gas supply used to be seen as a low-
risk activity with a return comparable to government bonds. The creative
chaos of third-party competition will definitely cause market dislocation,
but should eventually yield competitive dynamics. Such creative chaos is a
political hotbed. It includes the prospect of economic gains and losses for
the players, including newcomer brokers who purchase transportation
services.
In order to be effective, the right of transit requires increased and con-
sistent regulation in the public interest. A level playing field must provide
participants with notice of accurate or "transparent" commodity and trans-
portation rates. It is by no means clear, for example, whether rolled-in tolls
or incremental tolls will be employed to finance capacity expansion. Nor is
it clear whether so-called "as-billed" tolls will be allowed, or whether some
sort of incentive rate regulation can take root with domestic regulators.
Successful Community harmonization will necessitate harmonization
of the public utility law principles. Arguments about subsidiarity should not
obfuscate the need for a strong Community regulatory body that could
occupy the inter-Community field of natural gas transportation rates. The
European gas industry is presently secretive about toll methodology com-
pared to Canada and the United States, which openly investigate rate
rationale. The European gas industry, being understandably predicated
upon profit maximization, eschews the scrutiny that leonine regulatory
powers will bring to their monopoly business.
Hence, the EC natural gas regulatory relationship and objectives con-
cerning transit and different market structures are not yet settled. They are
nascent. They will alter the status quo but they are certainly not radical.
Some sort of regulation is needed in the EC to compensate for market
failure in the natural gas transmission sector. Stronger Community regula-
tion is also needed to accommodate access to pipelines by non-EC import-
ers. Regrettably, the regulatory stewardship of this vital energy source
does not go far enough or fast enough with its reforms. For instance, as it
stands, the proposed direct sale dispute resolution procedure is uncertain
and not binding. Provisions establishing the operators of the intercon-
nected transmission system seem insufficient to protect the public interest.
Other than general EC competition law provisions, there are no specific
legal instruments aimed at harnessing the concentrated upstream producer
cartels.
Politicization of natural gas transportation seems inevitable in Europe
because the stakes are high. Yet this need not be so. One way of de-
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politicizing the issue might be to create a "European Energy Commission"
with wide investigative and regulatory powers. Like North America, the
European Community should utilize public regulatory hearings, where a
wide body of intervenors regularly have locus standi to participate and util-
ize complex socio-economic and financial data to advocate their view-
points. Policy implications of related areas, like environmental impact
assessment, could be dealt with in this forum. A regulatory dialogue could
develop between the main actors, concurrently allowing a wide range of
intervenors to air their concerns.
Admittedly, the regulatory hearing process has been criticized for
"regulatory capture," whereby the vested and vociferous industry interest
groups dominate the agenda. Despite its faults, it brings to a public forum
matters of a public interest. Such a "European Energy Commission"
should employ administrative rule-making procedures and be a court of
first instance. Presently, the EC gas transit regulatory regime possesses
decentralized dispute resolution procedures, requiring time-consuming
adjudication in both national and Community forums. Ideally, disputes
could be resolved in a competent central tribunal, but these constructive
criticisms will require hard-won political consensus.
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